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 Abstract 
 
Research indicates that marriage has a large effect on reducing the risk of poverty and is 
associated with a higher probability of attaining affluence over the life course when compared 
with nonmarriage.  Using data from the American Dream Demonstration (N = 2,364), this study 
compares savings performances of married and unmarried low income participants in a matched 
savings program – Individual Development Accounts (IDAs).  The results indicate that both 
married and unmarried low income participants can save in IDA programs; however, unmarried 
participants are saving less than married participants.  We further examine possible factors that 
are associated with savings performance for these two groups.  Implications for policy makers 
and program administrators to better address the needs of unmarried participants are given.  
 
 
  
 Marriage has a large effect on reducing the risk of poverty.  A number of studies have indicated 
that unmarried individuals and single-parent families are more likely to live in poverty than their 
married counterparts (Blank, 1997; Furstenberg, 1990; Garfinkel & McLanahan, 1986; U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 2001; White & Rogers, 2000).  Compared to married couples, unmarried 
people also save much lower portions of their income and accumulate fewer assets.  For 
example, several studies have indicated that married-couple households have significantly higher 
wealth than other types of households (Waite, 1995; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002) and that marriage 
is associated with a higher probability of attaining affluence over the life course when compared 
with nonmarriage (Hirschl, Altobelli, & Rank, 2003).  The limited accumulation of assets in 
single-parent families has been increasingly recognized as an important contributing factor to the 
high poverty rate within this family type.  Lack of assets contributes not only to the low 
economic status of single-parent families but, maybe more important, restricts their economic 
mobility (Cho, 1999; Rocha, 1997; Sherraden, 1991). 
 
In the last decade, the importance of assets and wealth accumulation as a development strategy is 
gaining ground in both academic and policy settings (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Shapiro & Wolff, 
2001; Sherraden, 1991).  Theory and evidence indicate that accumulation of assets can promote 
economic and social development of individuals and families, which include personal well-
being, economic security, family stability, and civic behavior (Scanlon & Page-Adams, 2001; 
Sherraden, 1991).  Recently, a wide variety of public policies have been developed to promote 
assets ownership among low-income families.  One such policy is the Individual Development 
Accounts (IDAs).  IDAs are saving programs targeted to low-income people and provide 
incentives and an institutional structure for saving.  Account holders receive matching funds as 
they save for assets that promote long-term well-being and financial self-sufficiency such as a 
home, post-secondary education, or microenterprise (Sherraden, 1988,1991).   
 
In order to design programs that facilitate savings and asset accumulation for unmarried 
individuals and single-parent families, it is necessary to examine whether unmarried people can 
save and under what circumstances.  The purpose of this study is to examine and compare 
savings performance and related factors of married and unmarried participants in IDA programs.  
We begin by reviewing theoretical frameworks of saving and empirical evidence on the 
relationship between marital status and saving.  After the description of characteristics of IDA 
participants and bivariate analyses on savings of married and unmarried participants, regression 
analyses are conducted to examine how different factors are related to savings of married and 
unmarried people in IDAs.  Finally, policy and practice implications are discussed. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks of Savings 
 
Economic theories of saving  
The two mainstream economic theories of saving are the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani & 
Ando, 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and permanent-income hypothesis (Friedman, 
1957).  The life-cycle hypothesis assumes that consumption is primarily a function of long-term 
income, and consumption and saving will represent an individual's age or stage in the life cycle.  
The permanent-income hypothesis emphasizes that people constantly face random and temporary 
changes in their income.  Household consumption and savings reflect, in part, the differences of 
the relative share of long-term average income (permanent income) and transitory income.  
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 Further, the individuals’ consumption habits may change only when people are experiencing 
changes in their permanent income.  Both of these theories imply that income is a major 
determinant of savings (Deaton, 1992).  This theoretical summary borrows from Beverly and 
Sherraden (1999).   
 
From an economic perspective, marriage has several characteristics that may enhance wealth 
accumulation (Becker, 1981; Lupton & Smith, 2003; Schoeni, 1995; Waite, 1995; Waite & 
Gallagher, 2000; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002).  First, the total product of a married couple is larger 
than the sum of the outputs of each produced separately.  Second, the institution of marriage 
involves long-term commitment in which a division of labor enables each spouse to specialize in 
specific skills and duties.  This specialization increases the productivity and the efficiency of the 
household.  Third, economies of scale in consumption suggest that a married couple may achieve 
the same utility with less combined expenditure than the sum of their individual consumption if 
living apart.  Fourth, the requirements and expectations of married (versus single) life may 
encourage people to buy a house, save for children’s education, and acquire cars and other assets.  
Fifth, there is persistent evidence that married men earn more than unmarried men.  Sixth, the 
institution of marriage expands one’s social network and social support, which may result in 
additional opportunities and benefits that lead to saving.  Finally, married individuals may have 
access to many benefits such as health and life insurance provided by the spouse’s employment.   
 
Institutional theory of saving 
One of the drawbacks of the economic theories of saving is that they are biased toward higher 
income groups (Beverly, 1997).  The institutional model of saving posits that institutional factors 
other than income and preferences may play an important role in promoting savings (Beverly & 
Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003).  A fundamental 
difference between this perspective and the traditional neoclassical economic theory is in the 
way savings are being generated.  While the traditional economic theory views saving as a result 
of individual choices, this theory suggests that savings occur in households largely through 
institutional arrangements.  Asset accumulation is structured and often subsidized through 
institutional arrangements.  In the majority of households, unstructured savings, which are left 
over from income minus consumption, are likely to be smaller than asset accumulation generated 
by institutional arrangements.   
 
Specifically, Beverly and Sherraden (1999) propose four institutional determinants of savings: 
institutionalized saving mechanisms (access), targeted financial education, attractive saving 
incentives (e.g., matched savings), and facilitation (e.g., payroll deduction).  These four were 
originally specified by Sherraden, (1999) in the Center for Social Development web pages under 
“Key Questions in Asset Building Research.”  Sherraden, Schreiner and Beverly (2003) further 
suggest that specific savings expectations and the relaxation of savings limits and restrictions can 
help people save.  From this viewpoint, a major reason that low-income households save less is 
that they lack the access to incentives or institutions that promote and subsidize asset 
accumulation (Howard, 1997; Seidman, 2001; Sherraden, 1991, 2001).  For example, the non-
poor can save for retirement through institutionalized mechanisms with tax benefits; the poor, on 
the other hand, are much less likely to have jobs with pension benefits, thus their savings 
opportunities for retirement are more limited.   
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 Although further empirical evidence is needed, results of a number of studies support the 
propositions of the institutional view of savings.  For example, the role that access plays in 
promoting saving can be shown in statistical evidence of the inequality in pension coverage and 
accumulation rates (Orszag & Greenstein, 2000).  In terms of financial education, studies find 
that employee-based financial education increases both participation rates and amount of 
contribution in retirement plans (Bayer, Bernheim, & Scholz, 1996; Bernheim & Garrett, 1996).  
Financial education programs also significantly improve financial behaviors of low-income 
populations (Caskey, 2001).  In addition, Anderson, (1998) suggests that lack of knowledge is 
one of the reasons for the underutilization of public financial services and benefits by the poor. 
 
In support of the institutional perspective of savings, studies also find that individuals save less 
due to assets restrictions or limits.  For example, researchers have documented that the assets 
limits associated with means-tested welfare programs negatively influence savings of 
participants and potential participants (Carney & Gale, 2001; Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994, 
1995; Hurst & Ziliak, 2001; Powers, 1998; Ziliak, 1999).  Governments in many nations provide 
tax incentives for private pensions to encourage saving, which reflects the belief that in the 
absence of these incentives, individuals would not initiate and sustain sufficient savings for 
retirement (Orszag & Greenstein, 2000). 
 
Evidence on Marriage and Wealth Accumulation 
 
A number of studies have indicated that marriage may have a variety of positive effects on the 
well-being of individuals and families, controlling for other demographic and socioeconomic 
factors.  These effects include better financial well-being, better health, longer life, higher 
achievement of children, and higher earnings for married men (see a review by Waite, 1995; 
Waite & Gallagher, 2000).  A recent study by Hirschl, Altobelli, and Rank (2003) further 
indicates that marriage enhanced the lifetime probability of affluence, and Whites and women 
were more likely to benefit from marriage compared to Blacks and men.  
 
Studies that examine the impact of marital status on savings and family wealth consistently 
suggest that marriage can enhance wealth accumulation (Hao, 1996; Lupton & Smith, 2003; 
Seigel, 1993).  For example, through the analysis of data from the Health and Retirement Survey 
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Lupton and Smith (2003) find that married couples 
save significantly more than other household types, an effect not fully explained by their higher 
incomes nor the simple aggregation of two individuals’ wealth.  Similarly, Seigel (1993) reports 
that currently married older couples have higher median incomes and net worth than older adults 
who were widowed, divorced, or never married.  The study by Hao (1996) also indicates that 
married families have greater wealth than other types of families, and marriage reinforces the 
promoting effect of transfers on wealth.  
 
Some of these studies also examine the impact of marital history on wealth accumulation.  For 
example, several studies find that individuals who remain married throughout the life course 
have significantly higher wealth than those who are not continuously married, and divorce in 
particular has negative impact on wealth accumulation (Holden & Kuo, 1996; Wilmoth & Koso, 
2002).  Remarriage offsets the negative effects of a marital dissolution (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002).  
A number of marriages also has a negative effect on family wealth (Hao, 1996).  
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One of the limitations of the above studies on the impact of marriage on wealth is that they do 
not examine possible different factors that may be associated with savings and wealth 
accumulation of people with different marital status.  Another limitation is that current research 
has not paid much attention to the impact of marital status on savings among the low-income 
population.  Further, previous research has not examined how married and unmarried people 
save in structured savings programs.  Research on these issues may help understand special 
needs of unmarried low-income people and how they respond to institutional factors designed to 
stimulate savings.   
 
As mentioned, the purpose of this study is to examine and compare the experiences of married 
and unmarried participants in IDAs.  As the first quantitative assessment of the savings patterns 
of married and unmarried low-income populations in a structured savings program, the following 
questions are addressed: (a) Is there a difference in savings outcomes between married and 
unmarried participants in IDAs?   (b) What are the specific predictors that explain savings 
outcomes among these two groups?  (c) What are the policy implications for supporting asset 
building for these two groups?  
 
Methods 
 
Data and sample 
The data come from the “American Dream Policy Demonstration” (ADD), the first large-scale 
test of IDAs, designed to study the merits of IDAs as a community development and public 
policy tool (Sherraden et al., 2000).  Beginning in 1997, ADD research followed more than 2,000 
participants at 14 community-based program sites across the United States for four years (1997-
2001), with research planned through 2005.  ADD has a multi-method research design to gather 
information on many aspects of IDA programs and participants in order to inform assets-based 
policy outside of ADD.  IDA programs in ADD are operating in community-based organizations 
that are working together with financial institutions.  In most cases, participants in ADD are at or 
below 200% of the federal income-poverty guidelines, and the median participants is at about 
100% of the income-poverty guideline.  IDA savings are used for specific purposes, usually 
home purchase, post-secondary education, and microenterprise.   
 
The data set used in this study is from monitoring all savings transactions.  Program staff 
collected both programs’ and participants’ data with the Management Information System for 
Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA).  Savings data are from financial institutions and 
thus are highly accurate.  This may be the best available data set on savings patterns among low 
income families (Sherraden, 2002).  
 
Measures 
Participants in this analysis include all enrollees, including those who have dropped out of the 
program without a matched withdrawal.  Savings and asset accumulation consist of different 
elements (Schreiner et al., 2001).  Therefore, two dependent variables are being used in order to 
measure savings in IDA programs, trying to capture the two major aspects of savings: the 
savings amount and the regularity of the saving.  These variables include the average monthly 
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 net deposit (AMND) and the deposit frequency.  These variables were constructed and used in 
previous reports on ADD programs. 
 
Average monthly net deposit (AMND) is defined as net deposits per month and is calculated as 
deposit plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the number of months of 
participation.  Thus, AMND controls for the length of participation in the program.  AMND is a 
key measure of savings outcomes in this study because greater AMND implies greater savings 
and assets accumulation. 
 
Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit divided by the number of 
months of participation.  It shows how regularly a participant saves through time. 
 
The independent variables used include a wide range of participant demographic, financial, and 
program characteristics.  Specifically the following individual variables are included:  gender, 
age, residency, household size, number of dependents, race, education, employment status, 
receipt of public assistance, total income, income poverty ratio, ownership of checking account, 
ownership of savings account, car and homeownership.  In addition the following institutional 
characteristics are included:  direct deposit, hours of financial education, match rate, and 
program dummies.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Individual Characteristics 
 
* Gender   * Age 
* Race/ethnicity   * Education 
* Employment   * Number of Dependents 
* Residency                * Household Size 
* Public Assistance Use      * Total Income 
* Income Poverty Ratio      * Ownership of Checking Account  
* Home Ownership             * Ownership of Savings Account 
* Car Ownership 
 
IDA 
 
Savings 
 
Outcomes 
Institutional Characteristics 
* Direct Deposit           * Match Rate 
* Financial Education    * Program Dummies 
Analysis  
The effect of marital status on saving outcomes is examined using one-tailed t-tests and OLS 
regression models.  The purposes of the analysis are twofold.  First, we want to investigate 
whether there is a difference in saving outcomes between married and unmarried participants in 
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 IDA programs.  Based on previous research, we hypothesize that married participants have 
higher IDA savings and deposit more frequently than unmarried participants.  The second 
purpose of the analysis is to determine if different predictors are associated with saving 
performance of the married and unmarried groups.   
 
Descriptive statistics are first generated to compare the individual characteristics of the two 
groups (married vs. unmarried).  Next, in order to test differences in saving outcomes between 
married and unmarried IDA participants, two one-tailed t-tests for independent groups are 
performed.  The first t-test looks at the difference in AMND between married and unmarried 
participants, and the second t- test looks at the difference in deposit frequency.   
 
Then, with the aim of exploring the unique predictors of saving outcomes among married and 
unmarried participants in IDA programs, four separate regression models are executed.  The first 
model has AMND as the dependent variable and is executed with only married participants, and 
the second model has AMND as the dependent variable and is executed with only unmarried 
participants.  The third and fourth models use deposit frequency as the dependent variable and 
are executed with only married participants and only unmarried participants.   
 
Results 
 
Table 1 shows characteristics of married and unmarried IDA participants.  Compared to 
unmarried participants, married participants have higher levels of full time employment (67% vs. 
56%) and part time employment (24% vs. 19%).  Married participants also have higher levels of 
homeownership (30% vs. 12%) and car ownership (81% vs. 60%) and are less likely to be on 
public assistance currently (3% vs. 12 %) or in the past (21% vs. 43%).  In addition, married 
participants are more likely to have a checking account (70% vs. 63%).  However, married and 
unmarried participants have similar rates of having a savings account (49% vs. 51%) and similar 
patterns of educational attainment.  Married participants in ADD are less likely to be female 
(55% vs. 86%) and non-White (50% vs. 66%) and have fewer dependents.  Overall, these 
descriptive characteristics suggest that unmarried participants in ADD are somewhat more 
demographically disadvantaged than married participants in ADD. 
 
Table 1.  Participants Characteristics of Married and Unmarried IDA participants 
Variables Married (n=1,831) Unmarried (n=509) 
Continues variables  Mean (std.dev.) Mean (std.dev.) 
Age 36.2 (9.4) 35.5 (10.5) 
Number of dependents 2.1 (0.8) 2.4 (1.3) 
Household size 4.4 (1.6) 2.9 (1.5) 
(table continues) 
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 Table 1. (continued) 
Variables Married (n=1,831) Unmarried (n=509) 
Categorical variables Percent Percent 
Gender   
 Female 55 86 
Residency                                                            
 Rural 18 12 
Race/ Ethnicity   
 Caucasian 50 34 
 African American 26 52 
 Asian American or Pacific Islander 3 1 
 Latino or Hispanic 15 7 
 Native American 3 2 
 Other ethnicity  3 2 
Education    
 Did not completed high school  15 16 
 Completed high school or GED 28 25 
 Attended college  34 38 
 Completed 2-year degree 3 4 
 Graduated from college  11 11 
 Completed 4-year degree or more 9 7 
Employment   
 Employed full-time 67 56 
 Employed part-time 24 19 
 Not working 6 4 
 Unemployed 3 6 
 Student, not working 3 7 
 Student, also working  1 3 
(table continues) 
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 Table 1. (continued) 
Variables Married (n=1,831) Unmarried (n=509) 
Categorical variables Percent Percent 
Receipt of public assistance    
 Currently on TANF 3 12 
 Formally on TANF  21 43 
Asset ownership    
 Home ownership 30 12 
 Car ownership 81 60 
Banking experience    
 Ownership of checking account 70 63 
 Ownership of saving account 49 51 
 
Marital status and AMND  
Results of the t-test indicate that the difference in AMND between married ($24) and unmarried 
($18) participants is significant [t = 4.83, p = 0.00].  In order to examine how different factors 
are related to savings for married and non–married participants, an additional two regressions are 
executed.  The first regression model is with only married participants and the second regression 
model is with only unmarried participants.  Results from these two individual regressions 
indicate that race, hours of financial education, and match rate are associated with AMND for 
both the married and unmarried groups.  However, while these three independent variables are 
the only predictors of AMND among the married group, several additional variables are 
associated with AMND for the unmarried group.  These variables include level of education, 
household size, residency (living in a rural vs. urban area), number of dependents, ownership of 
a checking account, car ownership and home ownership.   
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 Table 2.  OLS Models Predicating the Effects of Individual and Institutional Variables on 
AMND for Married and Unmarried Participants 
 Unmarried  Married 
Independent Variables Coefficients p-value  Coefficients p-value 
Financial education  0.62 0.00  1.06 0.00 
Direct deposit 4.55 0.04  4.54 0.41 
Match rate      
 1:1 -5.56 0.06  -8.05 0.22 
 2:1 -9.36 0.00  -14.71 0.03 
 3:1 -4.02 0.25  -9.41 0.57 
 (4:1 to 7:1)       
Gender       
 Female 0.49 0.76  0.87 0.78 
 (Male)       
Age      
 Less than 40 years 0.11 0.20  0.18 0.52 
 40 years or more 0.02 0.84  -0.10 0.75 
Residency      
 Rural -4.71 0.05  3.89 0.53 
 (Urban)       
Household composition      
 Household size 1.35 0.02  -2.73 0.26 
 Number of dependents -1.49 0.02  1.15 0.79 
(table continues) 
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 Table 2. (continued) 
 Unmarried  Married 
Independent Variables Coefficients p-value  Coefficients p-value 
Race/ Ethnicity       
 African American -3.64 0.01  -1.35 0.74 
 Asian American or Pacific Islander 7.33 0.08  18.74 0.01 
 Latino or Hispanic 2.89 0.23  -0.31 0.95 
 Native American -6.71 0.05  -2.12 0.78 
 Other ethnicity  4.92 0.12  -2.62 0.80 
 (Caucasian)       
Education      
 Completed 2-year degree 0.12 0.97  2.35 0.78 
 Graduated from college  4.11 0.07  6.13 0.29 
 Completed high school or GED 0.48 0.78  6.42 0.16 
 Completed 4-year degree or more 10.04 0.00  11.27 0.06 
 Completed high school or GED 1.05 0.55  0.81 0.86 
 (Did not completed high school)       
Employment      
 Employed full-time -0.51 0.83  11.50 0.15 
 Employed part-time 1.93 0.43  10.67 0.20 
 Not working -1.45 0.68  6.39 0.48 
 Student, not working 5.27 0.09  3.50 0.75 
 Student, also working  6.05 0.09  25.43 0.07 
 (Unemployed)      
Receipt of public assistance       
 Formally on TANF  -0.28 0.82  -1.32 0.73 
 Currently on TANF  -2.30 0.25  5.42 0.54 
(table continues) 
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 Table 2. (continued) 
 Unmarried  Married 
Independent Variables Coefficients p-value  Coefficients p-value 
Income      
 Total income 0.19 0.25  0.44 0.30 
 Income poverty ratio  -0.24 0.89  -0.84 0.89 
Banking experience       
 Saving account -0.21 0.85  -0.86 0.77 
 Checking account 5.41 0.00  2.52 0.43 
Asset ownership       
 Car ownership 2.99 0.01  2.59 0.49 
 Home ownership  10.81 0.00  4.79 0.19 
n 1,561  434 
R2 0.27  0.28 
 
Race is significantly related to AMND for both married and unmarried participants.  Among 
married participants, AMND of Asian Americans is $18.7 higher than that of Caucasians.  
Among unmarried participants, when compared to Caucasians, being Native American is 
associated with a $6.71 decrease in AMND, and being African American is associated with 
$3.64 decrease in AMND.   
 
Hours of financial education attended by participants is also statistically related to AMND in 
both models.  For married participants each additional hour is associated with an increase in 
AMND of $1.06, and for unmarried participants an additional hour is associated with an increase 
in AMND of $0.62. 
 
Finally, for both married and unmarried participants, match rate is positively associated with 
AMND.  Specifically, married participants with a match rate of 2:1 save $15 less compared to 
those with a match rate between 4:1 to 7:1, and unmarried participants with a match rate of 2:1 
save $9 less when compared to those with a match rate between 4:1 to 7:1.   
 
Several additional variables are associated with unmarried participants only.  Among 
demographic variables, living in a rural area is associated with $4.71 less in AMND for 
unmarried participants compared to living in an urban area.  Unmarried IDA participants who 
have completed a 4-year college degree have about $10 higher in AMND than unmarried 
participants with less than a high school degree.  Household size is positively related to savings; 
each additional person in the household is associated with $1.35 more in AMND.  However, the 
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 dependency ratio or the number of household members per adult is linked with a decrease in 
AMND of $1.49.  Families with more dependents may find it harder to save. 
 
Assets ownership such as car ownership, homeownership and having a checking account are all 
positive predictors of AMND for unmarried participants.  Specifically, car ownership is 
associated with approximately $3 more in AMND, homeownership is associated with about $11 
more in AMND, and checking account ownership is associated with $5.41 more in AMND.  
Owning such assets may suggest that the participant had previous experiences with savings.   
 
Finally, direct deposit is significantly related to AMND.  Unmarried participants who had direct 
deposit are associated with $4.55 more in AMND than unmarried participants who did not have 
direct deposit.   
 
Marital status and deposit frequency  
The results of the t-test indicate a significant difference [t = 4.83, p = 0.00] in deposit frequency 
between married (0.51) and unmarried (0.47) participants.   
 
The regression results indicate that direct deposit and financial education are associated with the 
deposit frequency for both married and unmarried participants.  For the unmarried participants, 
four additional individual characteristics are also related to deposit frequency: ownership of a 
checking account, level of education, residency, and home ownership.   
 
Table 3.  OLS Models Predicating the Effects of Individual and Institutional Variables on 
Deposit Frequency for Married and Unmarried Participants 
 Unmarried  Married 
Independent Variables Coefficients p-value  Coefficients p-value 
Financial education  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 
Direct deposit 0.22 0.00  0.18 0.00 
Match rate      
 1:1 -0.04 0.20  -0.02 0.78 
 2:1 -0.05 0.09  -0.05 0.39 
 3:1 -0.04 0.27  -0.06 0.67 
 (4:1 to 7:1)       
Gender       
 Female -0.01 0.63  0.00 0.97 
 (Male)       
(table continues) 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
12 
 Table 3. (continued) 
 Unmarried  Married 
Independent Variables Coefficients p-value  Coefficients p-value 
Age      
 Less than 40 years 0.00 0.09  0.00 0.84 
 40 years or more 0.00 0.10  0.00 0.22 
Residency      
 Rural -0.08 0.00  0.02 0.67 
 (Urban)       
Household composition      
 Household Size 0.00 0.90  -0.02 0.46 
 Number of Dependents -0.01 0.29  0.00 0.93 
Race/ Ethnicity       
 African American -0.02 0.23  -0.06 0.14 
 Asian American or Pacific Islander 0.03 0.57  0.03 0.64 
 Latino or Hispanic -0.02 0.58  -0.02 0.70 
 Native American -0.07 0.09  -0.04 0.56 
 Other ethnicity  0.01 0.86  0.02 0.82 
 (Caucasian)       
Education      
 Completed 2-year degree -0.01 0.83  0.03 0.69 
 Graduated from college  0.06 0.02  0.01 0.79 
 Completed high school or GED 0.01 0.74  0.01 0.82 
 Completed 4-year degree or more 0.07 0.02  0.00 0.99 
 Completed high school or GED 0.01 0.55  0.00 0.98 
 (Did not completed high school)       
(table continues) 
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 Table 3. (continued) 
 Unmarried  Married 
Independent Variables Coefficients p-value  Coefficients p-value 
Employment      
 Employed full-time -0.01 0.65  0.04 0.57 
 Employed part-time 0.01 0.63  0.04 0.55 
 Not working -0.04 0.29  -0.01 0.93 
 Student, not working -0.01 0.78  -0.03 0.73 
 Student, also working  0.04 0.38  -0.04 0.77 
 (Unemployed)      
Receipt of public assistance       
 Formally on TANF  0.02 0.24  -0.02 0.65 
 Currently on TANF  0.01 0.67  -0.03 0.69 
Income      
 Total income 0.00 0.46  0.00 0.36 
 Income poverty ratio  0.01 0.57  -0.07 0.18 
Banking experience       
 Saving account 0.02 0.22  0.05 0.06 
 Checking account 0.05 0.00  0.03 0.27 
Asset ownership       
 Car ownership 0.01 0.29  -0.02 0.64 
 Home ownership  0.08 0.00  0.05 0.16 
n 1,561  434 
R2 0.33  0.34 
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 Similar to the outcomes on AMND, hours of financial education is positively related to deposit 
frequency for both married and unmarried participants.  Specifically, each additional hour of 
financial education is associated with 1 percentage point increase in deposit frequency.   
 
Direct deposit is also related to deposit frequency for both married and unmarried participants.  
Having direct deposit is associated with an increase in deposit frequency of 18 percentage points 
and 22 percentage points for married and unmarried participants, respectively. 
 
Several participant characteristics are related to deposit frequency for unmarried participants.  
Unmarried IDA participants who graduated from college (with 4-year degrees or with 
unspecified degrees) had 7 percentage points higher deposit frequency than those without a high 
school degree.  Being a resident of a rural area is associated with 8 percentage points lower 
deposit frequency than being a resident of an urban area.   
 
Homeownership and having a checking account are predictors of deposit frequency.  
Specifically, participants who are homeowners are associated with 8 percentage points higher in 
deposit frequency compared with participants who were not homeowners.  Checking account 
ownership is associated with 5 percentage points higher in deposit frequency.   
 
Discussion 
 
This study examines saving performance of married and unmarried participants in IDAs.  The 
results indicate that both married and unmarried low income participants can save in IDA 
programs; however, unmarried participants are saving smaller amounts than married participants.  
It seems that in ADD, unmarried people also have the ability and willingness to save when they 
are provided structured opportunities to accumulate assets.  Based on these results, policy makers 
should not assume that unmarried participants cannot save.   
 
In order to understand the unique experiences of saving among married vs. unmarried IDA 
participants, this study further examines possible factors that may be associated with saving 
performance for these two groups.  Results indicate that for both married and unmarried 
participants, financial education and match rates are positively associated with AMND, and 
financial education and direct deposit are positively related to deposit frequency.  It appears that 
institutional factors, not merely individual characteristics, are important in saving performance. 
 
IDA programs require financial education, and this study finds that participants who receive 
more hours of financial education save more money and save more frequently.  This result is 
consistent with other studies reporting that financial management programs can improve 
financial knowledge and behaviors of the low-income population (Caskey, 2001; Clancy, 
Grinstein-Weiss, & Schreiner, 2001; Jacob, Hudson, & Bush, 2000).  The association between 
financial education and AMND is stronger for married participants than for unmarried ones.  
This may suggest that married and unmarried participants have different knowledge deficiencies.  
Further studies on the content of financial education may help specify these differences in the 
future.   
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
15
 Second, an institutional theory of saving suggests that match rate is a possible incentive for the 
low-income population to save (Sherraden et al., 2003).  Participants in IDAs with match rates of 
2:1 saved less than those who had match rates ranging from 4:1 to 7:1.  This indicates that higher 
match rates may encourage people to save.  Similar to the impact of financial education, the 
association between match rates and saving is stronger for married participants.   
 
Third, based on an institutional view of saving, direct deposit is a simple and efficient method of 
facilitation (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999).  In moving money directly from one account to 
another, the chance that an individual will use the money for consumption is decreased.  Our 
study finds that direct deposit is positively associated with AMND for unmarried participants 
and with deposit frequency for both groups.  These results are congruent with the view that 
individuals who receive facilitation that makes saving more manageable and convenient increase 
their saving (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999).  This is not surprising, but public policy has, to date, 
mostly ignored saving facilitation for the poor.   
 
In addition to the above three program factors, race is also a common predictor of savings for 
both groups, but its effect is different for married and unmarried participants.  After controlling 
for other factors, the AMND of married Caucasian participants was lower than married Asian 
participants, but not different from other groups.  For unmarried groups, African Americans and 
Native Americans saved less than their Caucasian counterparts.  Unmarried African Americans 
and Native Americans may face greater difficulties in attempting to save.  This singles out an 
important issue in asset-based policy.  Further studies that examine race/ethnicity and savings 
among unmarried individuals are warranted.   
 
Turning to the factors that are related to saving performance of married and unmarried 
participants, several findings are worth mentioning.  First, direct deposit is associated with 
AMND of unmarried participants only.  Unmarried persons may have more barriers (such as 
more limited resources) to manage their savings, and strategies to facilitate saving, such as direct 
deposit, may matter more for these participants.   
 
Second, regression results indicate that participant characteristics, with the exception of 
race/ethnicity, had little impact on savings performance of married participants.  For unmarried 
participants, however, several additional individual characteristics are associated with savings.  
These factors include education, residency, household size, number of dependents, and asset 
ownership.  It seems that, as research suggests, marriage may provide institutionalized benefits 
that facilitate saving (Becker, 1981; Lupton & Smith, 2003; Schoeni, 1995; Waite, 1995; Waite 
& Gallagher, 2000; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002).  For example, it could be that some married 
participants have a spouse that has access to work-related benefits such as child care, and as a 
result the number of dependents is not a barrier to making a savings deposit.  It is also possible 
that car ownership does not matter for married people because the spouse may have a car.  
Another explanation may be that the marriage improves expectations and future orientation, 
factors that may encourage saving.  From ADD data we are unable to say; further research is 
needed on these issues.   
 
Some limitations of this study are important to note.  First, participants in IDA programs in ADD 
are both program-selected, because of eligibility criteria and self-selected, because they 
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 volunteer to participate in the program (Schreiner et al., 2001).  Therefore, ADD participants are 
different in some aspects when compared with the U.S.  general low-income population.  
Therefore, the results generated in this study may not represent how the low income population 
outside ADD would perform in IDAs.  Second, the assumption in this paper is that deposits in 
IDAs come from new savings.  However, it may be possible that participants in IDAs are 
transferring money from other assets they have (Schreiner et al., 2001).  Finally, because we 
cannot compare savings performance of ADD participants to non-ADD participants, it is not 
possible to attribute saving outcomes to participating in IDAs.  An experimental design in ADD 
may shed more light on this in the future. 
 
Despite these limitations, this study suggests that both married and unmarried low-income 
participants in ADD can save.  Therefore, IDAs may be an effective tool to help low-income 
people to save and accumulate assets.  Therefore, public policies that aim to help low income 
individuals save and build assets need to be expanded.  Currently, IDA programs only reach a 
small portion of low-income people, including unmarried low-income households.  In order to 
make a significant impact on the lives of low-income people, IDAs and other subsidized saving 
programs need to go to scale.  
 
This study found that match rate and financial education positively affected savings.  In order to 
implement IDA programs more effectively, match rates could be raised for some IDA 
participants, and the quality of financial education needs to be ensured.  This study also indicates 
that additional individual factors were related to the savings of unmarried participants.  For 
example, unmarried participants living in rural areas and with more children save less.  This may 
suggest that some unmarried people may have special needs that must be met in order to save 
more successfully in IDA programs.  Additional strategies may need to be adopted to help these 
more disadvantaged groups to save in IDAs.  
Center for Social Development 
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